It has been recently suggested that a gene therapy to prevent blindness or restore vision in patients suffering from retinal degeneration diseases leading to irreversible loss of sight could be priced at $500,000 per dose 6 . Such a price is suggested for a population between 1,000 to 3,000 patients. Assuming successful treatment that dramatically improves quality of life and functionality for many years, a price in the range of a heart transplant (a treatment for a larger population of older patients but life saving) could, therefore, be accepted by payers.
The introduction of gene therapies will force payers to rethink their price and reimbursement approaches initiating a new era in pharmaceutical economics where 'costeffective' differs widely from 'affordable' . As stated by one US payer we surveyed, "Gene therapies may be a blessing in disguise. They could finally push us to the point where Medicare cannot fund drug therapies anymore and, therefore, [to] where the US has to undergo drastic rethinking of drug benefit evaluation and pricing. " Payers will use approaches developed for gene therapy as models to limit the overall cost of managing orphan indications, cancers or even chronic diseases affecting a large number of people. In an interesting reversal of thinking, payers may also use gene therapies to question the cost of ongoing chronic therapies. Why should chronic therapy cost more than a product that restores organ function?
Our survey thus suggests payers might accept high price tags for gene therapies, but only if industry develops sound and rational P&R approaches based on payer perceived Despite the economic success of Bt cotton in India and of GM crops globally 9 , there has been continued controversy about commercial cultivation of GM crops. The activists opposing Bt cotton have tried to project the crop as a failure, often incorrectly attributing a large number of farmer suicides to the introduction of Bt cotton 10 . Various NGOs organized a protest against Bt brinjal as soon as it was declared safe by the GEAC 11 . Substantial resources were mobilized, and a group of NGOs working in different domains of agriculture were brought together across the country. Web-based NGOs, such as the Coalition for a GM-Free India, the Alliance for Sustainable and Holistic Agriculture, India for Safe Food and I Am No Lab Rat, proliferated to protest Bt brinjal.
These NGOs raised several concerns about Bt brinjal, including questions about the chronic toxicity or long-term safety of the crop, 'contamination' of brinjal biodiversity, the control of multinational companies over seed supply and loss of sovereignty over the seeds. Advertisements in local and national media by the MOEF invited people to participate in Bt brinjal consultations, attracting the general public to the issue to such an extent that it also motivated politicians, including the former Prime Minister of India H.D. Deve Gowda, to participate (ref. 12). National media coverage from the meetings, where unsubstantiated opinions about Bt brinjal were aired, generated widespread misinformation about Bt brinjal. The activists were successful in raising doubt among the general public and policymakers about the safety of Bt brinjal 13 . The motives of scientists who supported Bt brinjal during the public consultation were also brought into question; they were alleged to have direct and indirect pecuniary interest through involvement with the private sector. On the other hand, scientists with an anti-GM stance-even controversial authors from outside India, such as Gilles-Éric Séralini 14 -became 'authorities' in the debate. This led to a further polarized discussion of the risks and benefits of Bt brinjal in the Bt brinjal contravened established norms and procedures by inviting public comment on experiments of a scientific nature-a process that is mandated for projects or activities related to infrastructure that require prior environmental clearance 5 . In its rejection of the GEAC's assessment of Bt brinjal, the MOEF relied heavily on the public views against Bt brinjal that were generated during the public meetings and took advantage of the fact that the world-renowned agricultural scientist M.S. Swaminathan did not come out unequivocally in favor of Bt brinjal 6 .
In declaring a moratorium on Bt brinjal, the MOEF not only undermined the advice by expert groups but also ignored public comments received by the GEAC. The MOEF also overlooked the fact that farmers have to spray the crop repeatedly with a mixture of different insecticides to control FSB. The development of Bt brinjal was aimed at relieving the burden of repeated sprays with insecticide, which is not only responsible for a rise in the cost of cultivation and dwindling farm incomes but is also a health hazard for India's 1.5 million brinjal growers and the public at large 7 .
The moratorium on Bt brinjal has had far-reaching repercussions on the use of GM crops in India. Between 2010, when it was implemented, and 2014. the infrequent and delayed meetings of GEAC (at the behest of the MOEF) resulted in the discontinuation of projects and suspension of field trials for a variety of GM crops. These blocks on effort to counter the misinformation widely promulgated by activists intent on demonizing GM crops.
Brinjal (Solanum melongena) can become heavily infested by fruit and shoot borer (FSB) moths, particularly in South and Southeast Asia, leading to serious crop losses. Bt brinjal, expressing the gene cry1Ac (event EE-1), provides protection against FSB, and the event was rigorously and extensively tested in India during 2001-2009 under its well-developed regulatory system. The statutory regulatory body, the Genetic Engineering Approval Committee (GEAC) made public the Bt brinjal biosafety dossier and invited comments from the public for a period of 45 days, as per the procedure laid out in the Citizen's Charter of India 2 . After taking into consideration the test results, public views and approval by two expert committees, the GEAC, at a meeting held in October 2009, concluded that Bt brinjal event EE-1 was safe for environmental release 3 . But the GEAC decision could not be implemented, as the MOEF did not accept GEAC's approval and instead imposed a temporary and open-ended moratorium on the release of Bt brinjal 4 that has not yet been lifted. The moratorium decision was based on a series of nationwide public meetings organized by the Centre for Environment Education, an environmental nongovernmental organization (NGO), at the behest of the MOEF. Importantly, the MOEF's decision to hold public meetings on BARI Bt Brinjal-3 Nayantara in farmer's field in Rangpur area, Bangladesh. BdBIC, 2014 environmental applications 25 . This authority is supposed to replace existing regulatory committees, including the RCGM and the GEAC, which were believed by some to be prone to political and external influences. In February 2015, leading agricultural scientists in India (including P.K.G.) wrote to Modi, asking that the government lift barriers, including the requirement of NOCs from state governments, and the PM acknowledged the receipt of this communication and assured that appropriate action would be taken.
Bt cotton has already delivered substantial benefits to India by reducing reliance on chemical insecticides and doubling cotton yields and production 11 
Going forward, both the Indian government and the scientific community must also address the issue of how to communicate and educate the public about the safety of GM crops for human health, biodiversity and environment and the ways adoption of GM crops can benefit farmers and consumers. This can be achieved by institutionalizing knowledge sharing on GM crops in the country. An independent initiative by the government of India to share the internationally recognized facts about GM crops and their health and environmental safety track record would contribute immensely to public understanding of the risks and benefits. India can ill afford to ignore the potential of GM technology. Improving public perception will be an important step toward building societal acceptance and knowledge in the broader population, but concerted efforts will probably be needed to discredit and counteract those who promulgate misinformation, break laws and foment fears about this technology while ignoring credible science and evidence. crops in India. The multifaceted activities of NGOs against GM crops, compounded by the litigation in the Supreme Court of India, has meant that the regulatory bar for GM crops has become prohibitively high, placing the public sector institutions at a disadvantage. A classified report on the impact of NGOs on development, submitted to the Prime Minister of India in 2014 by the Indian Intelligence Bureau, corroborated that NGOs received enormous funding to oppose GM organisms 22 . NGOs were also active facilitators of news articles, and in collaboration with other activists, they contributed to the temporary and openended moratorium imposed on Bt brinjal in 2010 and the de facto ban on GM crop field trials that was recommended by the PSC and the TEC 17 (decisions on these two reports are still pending). Several NGOs have been working at the international and national levels to halt field testing and commercial cultivation of GM crops. Such groups have been linked to trespassing and destruction of field trials in several countries, including India 23 .
In contrast to the efforts of NGOs in demonizing the GM crops, developers of GM crops and public research agencies have not made adequate efforts to educate the public, policymakers, NGOs and politicians about the broad, international consensus on the safety of GM crops. Scientists have also failed to convince the public and politicians that the widely broadcasted threats of chronic toxicity or possible biodiversity losses due to Bt crops are not based on science 24 .
Today, the major challenge for the Indian regulatory system is to insulate it from the political discrimination and interference by special-interest groups that plagued Bt brinjal. In our view, the delays in field trials and approvals of GM crops for commercial cultivation could be curbed by reestablishing a regulatory system that is independent, science driven, risk specific and efficient.We contend that regulations should simply ensure the safety of GM crops for human health and environment. In this direction, some positive steps have already been taken by the new government of India and Prime Minister (PM) Narendra Modi: field trials were resumed in a few states 8 , and others may follow. The Biotechnology Regulatory Authority of India Bill, which was introduced in the Parliament of India in 2013 and lapsed in 2014, is likely to be reintroduced to create an autonomous and statutory regulatory body for organisms and products of modern biotechnology covering agriculture, forest and fisheries, human health and veterinary products and industrial and country, using no evidence based on science. The "Inter-academy Report on GM Crops, " produced jointly by India's six top science academies, endorsed the safety of Bt brinjal and recommended its limited release 15 but was dismissed by the MOEF on the grounds that the report lacked scientific rigor 16 .
The controversy continues to rage today. Misinformation about Bt brinjal and other GM crops remains unabated. The GEAC was demoted from an 'approval' to an 'appraisal' committee 17 . Under the control of the MOEF, the GEAC put off the regulatory decisions to allow field trials for dozens of GM crops (developed by both private and public organizations) that were recommended and forwarded by the review committee on genetic manipulation (RCGM) of the Department of Biotechnology (DBT) 18 . Meanwhile, the Supreme Court of India, while hearing the litigation on GM crops filed in 2004, held frequent hearings and passed interim judgments, leading to further delays in holding GEAC meetings. The situation was further aggravated when India's parliamentary standing committee (PSC) on GM crops and the technical advisory committee (TEC) appointed by the Supreme Court recommended a 10-year ban on field trials of GM crops 19 . The MOEF recommended the experts and the terms of reference of the TEC that were accepted by the Supreme Court 20 . The MOEF ignored completely a large number of other intervenors when selecting the experts for the TEC. The TEC's bias was reflected in the interim report they submitted recommending a 10-year moratorium on field trials with GM crops. The Supreme Court refused to accept the interim report and appointed a new TEC member with expertise in crop sciences (Rajendra Singh Paroda, former director general of the Indian Council of Agricultural Research). Finally, two contradictory TEC reports were submitted: one recommended a moratorium on field trials for Bt in food crops intended for commercialization, and the other (submitted solely by Paroda on July16, 2013) recommended the continuation of scientific experiments with further improvement in the existing regulatory system (submitted on June 30, 2013). Meanwhile, the scientific advisory committee to the Prime Minister expressed concern about the lack of a "science-informed, evidence-based approach" in the debate on genetic engineering in agriculture; this, however, had little effect on the debate's outcome 21 .
Regulatory oversight of Bt brinjal raises several questions for the future of all GM C O R R E S P O N D E N C E npg sometimes been invoked inappropriately, for example, in situations of generic, undefined alarm. For this reason, the European Commission (Brussels) recommends: "A decision to invoke the PP does not mean that the measures will be adopted on an arbitrary or discriminatory basis"; instead, a decision to apply the PP should be based on "detailed scientific and other objective information" 4 . That is not the case for GMOs. Any attempt to apply the PP to this fake container as a supposed coherent object is meaningless. Nowhere is this more evident than in a recent paper entitled "The precautionary principle (with application to the genetic modification of organisms), " the main author of which is renowned scholar and popular author Nassim Nicholas Taleb 5 .
In the very first sentence of the paper, Taleb et al. 5 seek to reformulate the meaning of PP. Thus, in the authors' view, the PP "states that if an action or policy has a suspected risk of causing severe harm to the public domain (affecting general health or the environment globally), the action should not be taken in the absence of scientific nearcertainty about its safety. " This is a major change in the spirit and the letter of the original and extended principle. The PP does not recommend waiting for near-certainty about the safety or health impact of the possible action that implies a suspected risk (which, moreover, can be local, not global); instead, it says that the lack of scientific certainty about the risk of an action must not in itself preclude states from intervening in order to contain such a risk preventatively. Even if the authors' reformulation of the PP definition were acceptable, they do not provide a clear justification for it.
In any case, for argument's sake, let us accept their re-interpretation of the PPa principle that, the authors state, must be invoked only when extreme danger is predicated, the consequences of which "can involve total irreversible ruin, such as the extinction of human beings or all life on the planet" 5 . Thus, we understand that the PP should, in short, be applied only in the case of an apocalyptic prospect. To distinguish the cases in which the PP should not be applied, and those instead where it must be considered applicable, the article enters into a detailed eight-page discussion on the assessment of risks-which may be more or less catastrophic-of human activities, with particular regard to planetary environmental scenarios. We won't enter into the merits of their explanation; let us accept it en bloc, and turn to the applications they choose for discussion. everything with often similar or identical properties, obtained through genetic manipulation that is neither direct nor targeted (e.g., traditional cross-breeding and hybridizations, cell culture, and physical or chemical mutagenesis).
As formulated in the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, the precautionary principle (PP) states: "In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation" 3 . Originally created with the aim of protecting the environment, the PP has subsequently been broadened by the European Union to cover also policies for safeguarding consumers, and human, animal and plant health. However, the PP has To the Editor: The term genetically modified organisms (GMOs) is a useless and imprecise category used to pigeonhole products (mostly crops) that have had their genetic content engineered to cancel undesirable phenotypic traits (e.g., allergenicity or toxicity) or to express desired added traits (e.g., resistance to pests, herbicide tolerance, improved nutritional properties or better performance under abiotic stress, such as flooding, drought or heat). It is theoretically and practically impossible to precisely specify a supposed common denominator for all these products; thus, the awkwardness and contradictions of the two main current pseudo-definitions by the European Union 1 (Brussels) and the Cartagena Protocol 2 . On the one hand, these two botched regulations lump together, in a very mixed pile, a whole range of 'green' biotech products with very different characteristics just because they all have spliced DNA; on the other, they omit
